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ABSTRACT 
 In order to advance science while preserving social solidarity and 
institutional trust, clinical research must carefully manage ethical 
tensions created by the two overlapping dynamics of conflict and un-
certainty.  One of these dynamics is inherent in the research enter-
prise itself and the other arises in the particular context of a public 
health emergency.  One test for both the moral soundness and prac-
tical utility of a framework for research ethics is its ability to help 
stakeholders understand and manage these ethical tensions as much 
as possible.  After clarifying the dynamics that give rise to these ten-
sions, this paper argues that two common approaches to evaluating 
clinical research have significant shortcomings in this regard.  This 
paper then sketches and defends the integrative approach to manag-
ing these tensions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mounting an effective response to an outbreak of pandemic in-
fluenza presents a profound public health challenge.  Whether we 
are able to meet this challenge in a way that can avoid a public health 
catastrophe will depend on a variety of factors, two of which are par-
ticularly important for the purpose of the present discussion.  The 
first factor is our ability to strengthen the public health infrastruc-
ture, broadly construed, in its capacity to carry out, on a large scale, 
public health response measures ranging from vaccination, preven-
tion, detection, social distancing, and treatment, to the maintenance 
of sanitary environmental conditions in a context in which the vari-
ous systems that contribute to this end may be strained by high mor-
tality rates and the fear of contagion.  A vigorous and proactive pro-
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gram of clinical and public health research has an important role to 
play in strengthening the capacity of the public health infrastructure 
to achieve some of these goals.  Undoubtedly, it is best to mount such 
a program before such an outbreak has been detected.  But even in 
the midst of an outbreak, clinical research may have an important 
role to play. 
A second critical factor in our response to an outbreak of pan-
demic influenza is our ability to maintain a broad sense of social soli-
darity, including an open relationship of trust between community 
members and the basic social institutions that are supposed to safe-
guard and advance their interests.  I will use the term “social solidari-
ty” to refer to a public sense of cohesiveness and interdependence 
among community members in which their awareness of a shared 
plight, and a shared fate, increases the likelihood of working across 
social divisions in order to achieve a common goal.  I will use the 
term “institutional trust” to refer to the willingness of community 
members to believe the information that they receive from basic so-
cial and governmental institutions, to rely on and comply with their 
instructions, and to provide various forms of cooperation and sup-
port for their efforts. 
Just as the presence or absence of social solidarity and institu-
tional trust can influence the prospects for carrying out valuable clin-
ical and public health research in an emergency context, when and 
how research is conducted can have an important impact on both so-
cial solidarity and institutional trust.  In the discussion that follows, I 
assume that an acceptable framework for planning and assessing re-
search in an emergency setting should be adequately responsive to 
each of these concerns.  That is, an acceptable framework should en-
sure not only that research can generate the information that will 
enhance the capacity of the health infrastructure of a community to 
respond to a particular threat, but it should also ensure that research 
is carried out in a way that embodies, and communicates to the pub-
lic, certain facts about the basic social and governmental institutions 
of the community.  In particular, acting on the basis of such a frame-
work should enable institutions to demonstrate that they appreciate 
the gravity of the situation that is unfolding, that they are exercising 
legitimate authority without bias or antipathy, and that they are using 
appropriate methods for the purpose of safeguarding and advancing 
the interests of community members. 
The following discussion describes how the integrative approach 
to clinical research reconciles these potentially competing demands.  
In Part II, this Essay discusses the two interconnected dynamics of 
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conflict and uncertainty that any acceptable framework for evaluating 
research during the course of a public health crisis must navigate and 
reconcile.  In Part III, this Essay discusses the shortcomings of two ex-
isting frameworks for evaluating risk in clinical research and how 
these shortcomings may be amplified by the special features of a pub-
lic health crisis.  In Part IV, this Essay outlines the integrative ap-
proach and explains how it avoids the shortcomings of these other 
frameworks and manages the dynamics of conflict and uncertainty 
discussed in Part III.  In Part V, this Essay provides examples of past 
instances of clinical trials during the course of a health crisis and dis-
cusses the relevance of the integrative approach to these examples. 
Part VI concludes by noting some features of the integrative ap-
proach that require further development and by emphasizing some 
of the unique challenges public health emergencies pose for balanc-
ing the interests of different stakeholders in the system. 
II. CONFLICT AND UNCERTAINTY IN A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS 
The central challenge facing an acceptable framework for eva-
luating clinical research in the context of a public health crisis is how 
to navigate two interlocking dynamics of conflict and uncertainty.  
The first dynamic is related to the research enterprise itself as a 
means of moving the community from a state of conflict or uncer-
tainty about how to respond to a health threat, to one of greater cer-
tainty or coherence.  In particular, there is in the research enterprise 
an inherent potential for conflict between the interests of current re-
search participants and those who might benefit in the future from 
such increased understanding.  The second dynamic is related to the 
special circumstances of a public health emergency.  Uncertainty is 
likely to be pervasive in this context, and both the effects of the 
emergency and the means that are used to respond to it may create 
or exacerbate social divisions that fall along fault lines such as race, 
class, socio-economic status, age, and gender.  It is worth saying a bit 
about each of these dynamics in turn. 
Inherent in the research enterprise is the potential for conflict 
between the interests of current research participants and the inter-
ests of the future beneficiaries of that research.  This potential for 
conflict is itself partly a function of various kinds of uncertainty that 
attend the research enterprise.  Consider the status quo at some 
point in time where there is uncertainty in the expert clinical com-
munity about how best to treat a particular medical condition.  Per-
haps the condition is novel, and no effective interventions currently 
exist.  Perhaps there are accepted interventions, but their relative 
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therapeutic, diagnostic, or prophylactic merits are unclear, or a mat-
ter of dispute.  In either case, the purpose of clinical research is to 
pose a well-defined research question that, if answered, will either 
eliminate this uncertainty or make a substantial contribution to its 
elimination. 
If we can think of the research enterprise as a kind of bridge that 
takes the community from a state of uncertainty to a state of greater 
clarity, then research participants are, in effect, the vehicles that 
make this possible.  They bear the risks and burdens associated with 
purely research-related procedures, and they undergo procedures or 
are provided with interventions with relatively unclear merits, as part 
of an effort to generate the information that will ensure that future 
patients receive a better standard of care. 
Whether this potential for conflict materializes in practice will 
hinge, in part, on how it is addressed.  Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs) are charged, among other things, with the task of ensuring 
that risks to participants are reasonable in light of benefits that might 
accrue to them, or in light of the value of the information that will be 
generated from the research.1  This means that the risks to research 
participants can be justified by potential benefits to those partici-
pants, but they need not be.2  Those risks may be justified entirely by 
the social value of the research.3  Moreover, as the importance of the 
research increases, so increases the level of risk to which research 
participants may be exposed permissibly.4 
How this potential conflict has been managed in the past has al-
so influenced the public’s attitude toward the research enterprise 
and the uncertainties that attend it.  Several commentators have 
noted that social attitudes toward biomedical research in the United 
States have vacillated at times between paradigms of protectionism 
and a right to access.5  In the protectionist paradigm, novelty is asso-
ciated with risk, and the research enterprise itself is regarded as inhe-
 
 1 Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2008). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id.; see also Charles Weijer, Thinking Clearly About Research Risks: Implications 
of the Work of Benjamin Freedman, IRB: REV. HUM. SUBJECTS RES., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 2. 
 4 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2). 
 5 See Anna Mastroianni & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Swinging On the Pendulum: Shifting 
Views of Justice in Human Subjects Research, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2001, at 
21 (discussing the shift in federal testing policies from centering around protection 
of subjects to focusing upon the desire for new research). 
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rently dangerous.6  To some degree, this may reflect a collective un-
ease about the potential for a shift in moral norms when one under-
takes an activity in which participants are valued less for who they are 
and what they can do as individual persons or agents, than for what 
can be learned from the aggregate data that is collected from or 
about them.7  Undoubtedly, however, such feelings of distrust are, 
more concretely, grounded in and inflamed by revelations of abuse in 
the research context.  For example, the legacy of the now infamous 
Tuskegee syphilis study continues to play a role in an undercurrent of 
distrust of public health in general and public health research in par-
ticular in African American communities.8 
On the other hand, the access paradigm emphasizes the power 
of clinical research as an engine for discovery.  Important discoveries 
not only increase our understanding of sickness and disease, but also 
provide the tools to intervene in order to reduce morbidity and mor-
tality, improve quality of life, and give people the information they 
need to make better informed decisions.  As a result, when a particu-
lar problem, condition, or population is the focus of clinical or public 
health research, the odds increase that members of that population 
who face that problem or condition in the future will benefit from 
this process of inquiry. Less uncertainty will surround various aspects 
of the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of the condition, and med-
ical personnel are more likely to have better alternatives for effectuat-
ing desired clinical or public health outcomes.  Alternatively, when 
problems, conditions, or populations are not the focus of clinical or 
public health research, the state of the art for addressing them is un-
likely to advance or change significantly.  As a result, those who are 
excluded from research participation are likely to face greater risks 
 
 6 Jeffrey P. Kahn et al., Implementing Justice in a Changing Research Environment, in 
BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH 166, 168 (Jeffrey P. Kahn et al. eds., 
1998). 
 7 Cf. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98 
DAEDALUS 219, 219–20 (1969) (suggesting that once tests are performed on living be-
ings, as compared to inanimate objects, “questions of conscience arise”); Alex John 
London, Threats to the Common Good: Biochemical Weapons and Human Subjects Research, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–Oct. 2003, at 17 (discussing two different conceptions 
of the common good and their differential relation to individual rights and liberties 
in the face of a perceived public health threat, such as would be posed by biological 
and chemical terrorism). 
 8 See Vicki S. Freimuth et al., African Americans’ Views on Research and the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study, 52 SOC. SCI. & MED. 797, 799 (2001); Jan M. McCallum et al., Awareness 
and Knowledge of the U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee: Implications for 
Biomedical Research, 17 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 716, 717 (2006). 
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when they access the health system to the extent that less is known 
about their condition, or fewer options are available to treat it.9 
An analogue to this population-level view exists at the individual 
level.  This is the idea that clinical research often employs the best 
and the brightest in the medical community and uses the most rigor-
ous methods to administer the most cutting-edge care.10  On this view, 
there are substantial benefits to being in clinical research, not just for 
those who have the condition under study, but for those who partici-
pate in individual trials.11 
Managing this dynamic of conflict and uncertainty under nor-
mal or non-emergency circumstances can be difficult.  The revelation 
that research participants have been abused or treated unfairly can 
cause public attitudes to shift in protectionist directions, increasing 
wariness of research and leading to tighter oversight.12  Over time, 
tighter restrictions on research may lead some to think that progress 
has been slowed and that in the name of protection, some groups 
have missed out on important social benefits.13  This can cause a 
swing back toward the paradigm of access.  If social attitudes move 
too far in this direction, inhibitions against offering or accepting cer-
tain risks may be reduced, which, in turn, can create the potential for 
the abuse of research subjects. 
Such difficulties are exacerbated by the special circumstances of 
a public health emergency.14  In part, this is because the crisis setting 
precipitates its own dynamic of conflict and uncertainty.  In a very 
real sense, uncertainty is likely to precede a public health emergency 
as the community and relevant authorities attempt to determine the 
scope and severity of the emerging outbreak.  Beyond this, uncertain-
ties emerge concerning who has been infected, where it is safe to tra-
vel, who it is safe to associate with, how to protect oneself from be-
coming infected, and what to do once one becomes infected.  There 
 
 9 See Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 24, 26–27; Charles Weijer & Robert A. Crouch,  Why 
Should We Include Women and Minorities in Randomized Controlled Trials?, 10 J. CLINICAL 
ETHICS, 100, 100 (1999). 
 10 John D. Lantos, The “Inclusion Benefit” in Clinical Trials, 134 J. PEDIATRICS 130, 
131 (1999). 
 11 Id. at 130.  Explanations for the apparent benefit of participation in trials in-
clude “selection bias, placebo effects, and adherence to well-defined protocols.”  Id. 
 12 Id. at 131. 
 13 See Dresser, supra note 9, at 26–27. 
 14 Working Group on “Governance Dilemmas” in Bioterrorism Response, Leading 
During Bioattacks and Epidemics with the Public’s Trust and Help, 2 BIOSECURITY & 
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 25, 27–29 (2004). 
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are also social uncertainties surrounding the basic institutions of the 
community.  Do government and public health authorities grasp the 
magnitude of what is unfolding?  Are public health and medical insti-
tutions responding in a way that is effective, or are they merely trying 
to prevent panic? 
Public health emergencies are also scenes of conflict.  To some 
degree, the mere emergence of pandemic flu will stress the social fa-
bric of affected communities, and this, in turn, has the potential to 
inflame and widen existing social, racial, and economic fault lines.  
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that difficult decisions will 
have to be made about how best to deploy scarce social resources.  
Adding to such pressures is the special dread that accompanies public 
health emergencies, born of the widespread perception that ordinary 
social and ethical norms may not have the same force in this new 
context.  Such worries may permeate social relations, and they have 
already been raised in the context of rationing scarce resources, such 
as flu vaccines and antivirals.15  But they are likely to have special force 
in the context of research where a proclivity toward utilitarian think-
ing is likely to be emboldened.  In particular, as the threat to society 
increases, and research represents a credible means of stemming the 
tide of death and disease, the potential benefits for the many may be 
seen as large enough to outweigh even dramatic and certain risks to a 
few.  Perhaps paradoxically, however, to the extent that individuals 
perceive that their personal interests may be unduly subordinated to 
or sacrificed for advances in understanding, they may refuse to partic-
ipate in research.  Such concerns are likely to be particularly salient 
in disadvantaged or otherwise marginalized communities.16 
On the other hand, although eschewing the conduct of research 
in a public health crisis may reduce some problems of social solidari-
ty, it poses its own challenges to institutional trust.  Directly deploying 
non-validated interventions under the umbrella of the state’s national 
security or public health emergency powers (as was recently en-
hanced by the Project BioShield Act of 200417) does not eliminate or 
reduce uncertainty about the relative merits of those interventions.  It 
therefore does not address the larger community’s uncertainty about 
whether the methods of crisis response being deployed in the com-
 
 15 See John D. Arras, Rationing Vaccine During an Avian Influenza Pandemic: Why It 
Won’t Be Easy, 78 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 283, 287–300 (2005). 
 16 See Freimuth et al., supra note 8, at 797–98. 
 17 See Stuart L. Nightingale et al., Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to Enable Use of 
Needed Products in Civilian and Military Emergencies, United States, 13 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1046, 1048–49 (2007). 
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munity are safe and effective.  This failure, in turn, may engender le-
gitimate frustration, not only about the uncertainties that may attend 
exposure to an investigational intervention, but also about the inabili-
ty to learn from this experience in order to reduce the uncertainties, 
and therefore the risks, that community members face in the future. 
Some of these tensions appeared in the response to the anthrax 
attacks on the U.S. Capitol in 2001.18  Given the uncertainty about 
how best to treat individuals who were at risk for inhalational anth-
rax, treatment recommendations changed over time.  On December 
21, 2001, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services pub-
lished a list of three preventative treatment options for persons at risk 
for inhalational anthrax, some of whom had already completed the 
recommended 60-day regimen of antibiotics.19  These were: 
1) 60 days of antimicrobial prophylaxis, accompanied by monitor-
ing for illness; 2) 40 additional days of antimicrobial prophylaxis 
(intended to provide protection against the theoretical possibility 
that anthrax spores might cause illness up to 100 days after expo-
sure) accompanied by monitoring for illness or adverse reactions; 
and 3) 40 additional days of [antimicrobial] prophylaxis plus 3 
doses of anthrax vaccine administered over a 4-week period.
20
 
The recommendation stated that, “[a]s an investigational new drug, 
the vaccine should be administered with informed consent, and vac-
cinated persons may participate in a follow-up evaluation measuring 
the effect of the vaccine when administered after exposure.”21 
Uncertainty about the relative merits of these options created 
the rationale for an important prospective trial.22  Yet a failure to 
communicate the nature of the uncertainty and the importance of 
 
 18 For information regarding the background of the anthrax attacks and reac-
tions to them, see Janice C. Blanchard et al., In Their Own Words: Lessons Learned from 
Those Exposed to Anthrax, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 489 (2005); Sandra Crouse Quinn et 
al., The Anthrax Vaccine and Research: Reactions from Postal Workers and Public Health Pro-
fessionals, 6 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 321 
(2008) [hereinafter Quinn et al., Anthrax Vaccine];  Sandra Crouse Quinn et al., Postal 
Workers’ Perspectives on Communication During the Anthrax Attack,  3 BIOSECURITY & 
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY PRAC. & SCI. 207 (2005) [hereinafter Quinn et 
al., Postal Workers’ Perspectives]. 
 19 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), Notice to Readers: Additional Op-
tions for Preventive Treatment for Persons Exposed to Inhalational Anthrax, 50 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1142, 1142, 1151 (2001), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5050a5.htm. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 1151. 
 22 See Denise L. Doolan et al., The US Capitol Bioterrorism Anthrax Exposures: Clinical 
Epidemiological and Immunological Characteristics, 195 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 174, 175 
(2007). 
LONDON (FINAL EDIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/13/2010  2:32 PM 
2009] CLINICAL RESEARCH IN A CRISIS 1181 
research to its resolution, along with differing perceptions of whether 
participation in the follow-up research was mandatory or optional, 
contributed to a perception of differential treatment between the 
predominantly white population of the Senate office building and 
the predominantly African American population of U.S. postal work-
ers.23  Moreover, the postal workers made explicit reference to the 
now infamous Tuskegee syphilis study in expressing concern that 
they were being subjected to experimentation that was inconsistent 
with their own basic health interests.24 
Finally, the perception on the part of at least some groups that 
the research enterprise itself may be particularly risky raises the pros-
pect that some who were offered the investigational vaccine may have 
perceived the alternative of not participating in the research follow-
up as involving less risk than participating.  In actuality, if there was a 
difference, it is likely that not participating in the follow-up may have 
involved greater risk, if individuals received less frequent or careful 
monitoring from their personal physicians.25  Additionally, reluctance 
to participate in research impedes the process of gathering the in-
formation necessary to improve the standard of care moving forward. 
To be clear, coping with these dynamics of conflict and uncer-
tainty requires a variety of efforts on the part of a diverse array of 
stakeholders.  Even in the best of circumstances, it is unlikely that 
these issues can be eliminated entirely, and it would be nearly imposs-
ible to eliminate them simply by adopting a particular framework for 
assessing the ethics of research.  As such, one test for the adequacy of 
a framework of research ethics is not whether it can eradicate these 
tensions, but whether it can help manage them in a way that recon-
ciles the demands of advancing science with the goal of preserving 
and enhancing social solidarity and institutional trust as best as is 
feasible under the non-ideal conditions of an emergency situation. 
III. THE NEED FOR GUIDANCE 
There is currently widespread consensus about a menu of crite-
ria that must be met in order for clinical research to be ethically ac-
ceptable.26  For example, the research must be socially valuable, the 
 
 23 Blanchard et al., supra note 18, at 492. 
 24 Id. at 493; Quinn et al., Anthrax Vaccine, supra note 18, at 328. 
 25 See, e.g., Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, A Critique of Clinical Equipoise: The-
rapeutic Misconception in the Ethics of Clinical Trials, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 
2003, at 17, 21–22. 
 26 See Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a) (2008); NAT’L COMM’N 
FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, BELMONT 
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risks to participants should be minimized, risks that cannot be elimi-
nated should be reasonable, the selection of subjects should be fair, 
the representation of various subgroups of the populations should be 
equitable, and where possible, participants should participate only af-
ter having given their free and informed consent.27  One ambition of 
acceptable frameworks for research ethics is to help researchers, 
sponsors, IRB members, and community members assess research 
protocols in light of these criteria in a coherent, ethically defensible, 
and interpersonally justifiable manner.  Unfortunately, the two most 
popular frameworks for guiding the ethical assessment of clinical re-
search each suffer from significant limitations. 
The first of these frameworks, what I call the “common rule ap-
proach,” adopts a sort of constrained utilitarian approach to evaluat-
ing research.  Its proponents regard this as a utilitarian approach to 
the extent that it fundamentally involves trading risks to research par-
ticipants for advances in science that will promote the welfare of fu-
ture patients.28  It is a constrained utilitarian approach, however, be-
cause the scope of this utilitarian calculus is limited or constrained by 
additional moral requirements.29  For example, the requirement to 
respect the autonomy of research participants constrains the underly-
ing utilitarian aspirations of the approach because advances in social 
welfare alone cannot justify conscripting subjects into clinical re-
search without their free and informed consent.30  Similarly, require-
ments of fairness prohibit research from unduly targeting vulnerable, 
marginalized, or disadvantaged populations.31 
Proponents of this position have also argued that the underlying 
utilitarian calculus is constrained in an additional dimension.  That 
is, they view the reasonableness of risks as a fundamentally utilitarian 
question about whether the expected benefits of a research initiative 
are sufficient to justify the various risks and burdens to participants 
that are not already justified by the prospect of direct benefit to those 
same individuals.32  But they argue that even here, these tradeoffs 
 
REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS 
OF RESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,193–97 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter BELMONT 
REPORT]; Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA 
2701, 2701–07 (2000). 
 27 See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 26, at 23,195–97. 
 28 See Miller & Brody, supra note 25, at 21. 
 29 See id. at 23; see also sources cited supra note 26 (describing additional moral 
requirements that constrain this utilitarian approach). 
 30 See Miller & Brody, supra note 25, at 23. 
 31 Id. at 24. 
 32 Id. at 21. 
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should not cross over a moral threshold, the threshold of exploita-
tion.33 
Unfortunately, the requirement not to exploit participants ap-
pears to lack substantive content distinct from the idea of ensuring 
that the tradeoffs in risk and benefit are reasonable.34  That is, we are 
told that in order for subjects to be exploited they would have to be 
subjected to risks that were not reasonable in light of the anticipated 
benefits, either to participants themselves or to the larger communi-
ty.35  Because the determination of whether subjects are exploited re-
quires a determination of whether the risks to participants are out-
weighed by the various potential benefits of the research, this 
requirement does not provide an additional, independent constraint 
on the underlying utilitarian calculus.  Rather, if anything, the touch-
stone for avoiding exploitation in this context appears to be simply 
ensuring that risks to participants can be justified on utilitarian 
grounds. 
Furthermore, this approach provides almost no additional guid-
ance to stakeholders about how to make such determinations in prac-
tice.  Individual researchers, sponsors, IRB members, and community 
members more generally, are left to their own devices to provide 
some rough estimate of the value of individual research initiatives 
and how to weigh or trade that kind of value against the risks to 
which research participants would be exposed.  Moreover, even the 
appeal to “utilitarianism” here obscures the fact that “utilitarianism” 
is the name of a fairly large family of views, some of which differ sig-
nificantly in their operational content.36  As a result, this approach 
provides woefully little practical guidance to the stakeholders that 
have to rely on it.  Moreover, because there are myriad ways of speci-
fying the key variables in determining when risks are reasonable, this 
approach provides a veneer of operational content to what will ulti-
mately be a contest of diverse and potentially competing intuitions. 
Stakeholders are likely to need practical guidance most in cases 
where intuitions conflict.  At some point, even the most rigorous 
 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Alex John London, Reasonable Risks in Clinical Research: A Critique and a Pro-
posal for the Integrative Approach,  25 STAT. MED. 2869, 2871–72 (2006) [hereinafter 
London, Reasonable Risks]; Alex John London, Two Dogmas of Research Ethics and the 
Integrative Approach to Human-Subjects Research, 32 J. MED. & PHIL. 99, 101–02 (2007) 
[hereinafter London, Two Dogmas]. 
 35 See London, Reasonable Risks, supra note 34, at 2871–72; London, Two Dogmas, 
supra note 34, at 101–02. 
 36 For a convenient summary of possible consequentalist views, see SHELLY KAGAN, 
NORMATIVE ETHICS 25–69, 189–239 (1998). 
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framework for decision making must rely on the good will, common 
sense, and practical judgment of those who must apply it.  But for the 
common rule approach, this point is reached sooner than it need 
be—as soon as intuitions conflict.  Moreover, to the extent that this 
framework provides deliberators with relatively anemic resources for 
justifying their judgments to their fellow citizens, it may create the 
appearance, if not the reality, of a degree of arbitrariness to decision 
making that may undermine social trust in the institutions of clinical 
or public health research. 
The second most popular framework attempts to remedy some 
of these shortcomings by introducing moral norms that can be used 
to determine, with greater operational clarity, when research risks are 
reasonable.  I have referred to this as the “duty of personal care ap-
proach,” because the various proposals that fall under this heading 
share the foundational normative idea that, like physicians, research-
ers owe a duty of personal care37—sometimes referred to as a thera-
peutic obligation38 or a fiduciary duty39—to each research participant.  
On this view, risks to participants are reasonable when they are con-
sistent with, or do not abrogate, this duty.40 
The duty of personal care is thus supposed to provide a substan-
tive constraint on permissible risk.41  In order to provide operational 
guidance to deliberators, variants of this approach agree that it is 
permissible for the treatment of research participants to be deter-
mined by a random process only if there is reasonable uncertainty 
about the relative therapeutic merits of the interventions to which 
participants might be allocated.42 
Different frameworks that fall under this heading can then be 
distinguished by the way that they specify key variables.43 First, whose 
uncertainty matters?  Proponents of the “uncertainty principle” argue 
 
 37 CHARLES FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 49–50 (1974). 
 38 Don Marquis, Leaving Therapy to Chance, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1983, at 
40, 42. 
 39 Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Rehabilitating Equipoise, 13 KENNEDY INST. 
ETHICS J. 93, 95 (2003). 
 40 See id. at 112. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. at 91; see also Austin Bradford Hill, Medical Ethics and Controlled Trials, 1 
BRIT. MED. J. 1043, 1047 (1963). 
 43 See Alex John London, Clinical Equipoise: Foundational Requirement or Fundamen-
tal Error?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BIOETHICS 571, 573–77 (Bonnie Steinbock 
ed., 2007). 
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that it must be the individual clinician-researcher.44  Proponents of 
clinical equipoise argue that it should be the medical community.45  
Proponents of community equipoise argue that it should be the 
broader social community, not just the medical community.46 
Second, what is the epistemic threshold for determining when 
uncertainty obtains and when it has been disturbed?  Proponents of 
theoretical equipoise adopt a fragile epistemic threshold that is dis-
turbed as soon as the various arms of the trial are no longer judged to 
be an equal bet in prospect.  Proponents of clinical equipoise adopt a 
more robust threshold according to which uncertainty exists so long 
as the evidence about the relative merits of the interventions in ques-
tion is not of sufficient weight to change clinical practice in the ex-
pert community. 
This general approach has some distinct advantages and the view 
that I outline below incorporates several of them.  Before turning to 
that discussion, I want to note two substantial limitations to this ap-
proach. 
First, the claim that researchers owe participants a duty of per-
sonal care is often grounded on the assumption that, even in the con-
text of research, researchers are still in some fundamental respect 
acting as physicians.  This claim is most plausible in cases where re-
searchers are in fact physicians; it is less plausible in cases where re-
searchers are, for example, public health workers.  Moreover, in some 
public health contexts, the interventions in question may be applied 
directly to the environments in which individuals live, rather than to 
individuals themselves.  Such public health research may nevertheless 
involve human subjects and may have equally momentous implica-
tions for their health and welfare.  It is not clear that the norms of the 
physician-patient relationship are applicable in such cases, or that 
they are the proper norms for regulating this kind of research, but an 
 
 44 See Hill, supra note 42, at 1047; Richard Peto et al., Design and Analysis of Ran-
domized Clinical Trials Requiring Prolonged Observation of Each Patient (pt. 1), 34 BRIT. J. 
CANCER 585, 606–07 (1976); Richard Peto & Colin Baigent, Trials: The Next 50 Years, 
317 BRIT. MED. J. 1170, 1170 (1998); David L. Sackett, Equipoise, a Term Whose Time (If 
It Ever Came) Has Surely Gone, 163 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 835, 836 (2000). 
 45 See Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 141, 144 (1987) [hereinafter Freedman, Equipoise]; see also Benjamin 
Freedman, Placebo-Controlled Trials and the Logic of Clinical Purpose, 12 IRB: REV. HUM. 
SUBJECTS RES. 1, 5 (1990) [hereinafter Freedman, Placebo-Controlled Trials]. 
 46 Fred Gifford, Community-Equipoise and the Ethics of Randomized Clinical Trials, 9 
BIOETHICS 127, 128–29 (1995); Jason H. T. Karlawish & John Lantos, Community Equi-
pose and the Architecture of Clinical Research, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 385, 
385–86 (1997). 
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adequate framework for evaluating research should be broad enough 
in scope to apply to all research involving human subjects. 
The second limitation is more subtle, but perhaps of much 
greater significance.  To see it, consider the following dilemma.  The 
duty of personal care sets the parameters for acceptable risk in this 
approach, and this duty has been traditionally understood as requir-
ing individual clinicians “to benefit their patients ‘according to their 
best judgment.’”47  How should we understand the content of this du-
ty?  One possibility is to view it as requiring researchers to advance 
the medical best interests of participants without reference to the 
broader goals and values of individual participants themselves.  One 
advantage of this interpretation is that its application does not re-
quire an appeal to the particular valuations of individual trial partici-
pants.  This makes it suited to current practice since IRBs and others 
must determine that the risks in any proposed study are reasonable 
before they may permissibly seek the informed consent of potential 
participants.   
However, this interpretation risks being overly restrictive and pa-
ternalistic.  Presumably, for instance, it would prohibit healthy volun-
teers from participating in most research at least to the extent that 
such participants are subjected to some affirmative risks in order to 
advance science.  Moreover, this interpretation is far more rigid than 
the way this duty is commonly interpreted in the context of clinical 
medicine.48  With the rejection of medical paternalism has come the 
recognition that health values are not necessarily a person’s preemi-
nent or paramount concern and, as a result, respect for persons re-
quires caregivers to advance the health interests of patients in a way 
that is responsive to the broader goals and values of such persons.49  
Given this recognition, physicians routinely assist patients in under-
taking medical procedures that pose affirmative risks to the patient 
that are not compensated by direct medical benefits to that patient.50  
For example, living persons who donate a lobe of their liver or one of 
their kidneys for transplantation are exposed to the risks and burdens 
of the surgical procedure, the prospect of infection, and a small 
probability of death, all for the benefit of the organ recipient. 
Assume, therefore, that we understand the duty of personal care 
as a duty to advance the medical best interests of subjects in a way 
 
 47 BELMONT REPORT, supra note 26, at 23,194. 
 48 Id. 
 49 ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 185–86 
(1980). 
 50 BELMONT REPORT, supra note 26, at 23,193 n.* (first footnote). 
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that is informed by the broader goals and values of those persons.  
Now rigidity and paternalism are eliminated, but at the cost of the de-
terminacy or operational content of the standard.  In part, this is be-
cause this standard must be applied before it is permissible to offer 
participation in the study to participants.  It therefore faces a kind of 
catch-22: the parameters for acceptable risk are set by the physician’s 
duty to advance the medical best interests of individual patients, con-
sistent with that individual’s broader goals and values, but this stan-
dard must be used by an IRB to assess the acceptability of risks in a 
clinical trial before participation can be offered to any particular in-
dividual.  That is, IRBs must apply this test before they have any in-
formation about the values of potential trial participants.  Moreover, 
if the duty of personal care permits assisting patients in advancing 
their project of helping others through living organ donation, then it 
may also be permissible to ask research participants to forgo signifi-
cant health benefits, or to bear significant risks and burdens, for the 
purpose of advancing science.  While this may indeed be permissible, 
it becomes questionable whether the physician’s duty of personal 
care now provides an independent constraint on the reasonableness 
of risks. 
These problems are only exacerbated when considering research 
that might be carried out in the midst of a public health emergency.  
On the one hand, community members should be able to view re-
search as a viable means of serving the common good, and it seems 
reasonable that they should be permitted to bear some affirmative 
risks to themselves in order to help their compatriots.  At the same 
time, it seems reasonable to think that members of a pluralistic com-
munity will disagree about the nature and extent of the risks that so-
cial institutions can offer to community members, even in the service 
of noble ends.  Additionally, the strains on institutional trust and so-
cial solidarity will likely only be exacerbated if disagreement about 
the latter issue erupts in the context of a public health emergency. 
IV. AN OUTLINE OF THE INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 
Forging social solidarity within liberal democratic communities 
poses a challenge even under non-emergency situations because such 
communities are characterized by, and often explicitly committed to 
fostering, social pluralism.  That is, individual community members 
may disagree about fundamental questions of value, including the 
value of various life plans, the importance of various social goals or 
objectives, and the means that are appropriate for advancing or at-
taining these.  This disagreement, in turn, creates a challenge for se-
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curing institutional trust, insofar as some may regard important social 
institutions as offering undue assistance or support to some segments 
of the community while neglecting or frustrating the projects or 
plans of others. 
In order to preserve or foster institutional trust in the context of 
a public health emergency, social institutions, such as the institutions 
responsible for emergency response and conducting clinical and pub-
lic health research, require a social standpoint that the members of 
such communities can recognize as appropriate for making impor-
tant social decisions.  Moreover, if this standpoint is sufficiently com-
pelling to secure the allegiance of community members, it may pro-
vide a lever for preserving or enhancing social solidarity. 
A. The Theoretical Underpinning of the Integrative Approach 
The integrative approach constructs the required standpoint by 
adapting a distinction first enunciated by John Rawls.51  Rawls notes 
that members of liberal democratic communities may differ radically 
in what I call their “personal interests.”52  These “personal interests” 
are interests that agents have in their personal conception of the 
good and the distinctive projects and plans that they adopt as a 
means of pursuing this conception.53  Differences in and disagree-
ments about personal interests are a common source of conflict in 
social decision making and public policy.  But, Rawls argues, this first-
order conflict over values and ends is predicated on a shared, higher-
order interest in the ability of each individual to advance his or her 
first-order interests effectively without unwarranted outside interfe-
rence.54 
Within the integrative approach, this shared higher-order inter-
est in being free to advance one’s personal interests provides the ba-
sis for distinguishing and giving evaluative priority to what I call “ba-
sic interests.”  Basic interests are interests that agents have in being 
able to cultivate and to exercise those fundamental human capacities 
that are constitutive of what Rawls refers to as our two moral powers: 
the capacity to formulate and to pursue a life plan based on a con-
ception of the good and the capacity to regulate our conduct with 
others on the basis of principles of right.55  Such basic interests in-
 
 51 See John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 
159, 159–85 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
 52 Id. at 160–61. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 164–65. 
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clude developing and exercising one’s capacities for reflective 
thought and practical decision making, developing and cultivating 
one’s basic affective or emotional capacities, and having the effective 
freedom to exercise those capacities in the pursuit of particular 
projects and meaningful social relationships.56 
The integrative approach uses this shared higher-order interest 
to define a social position of common ground from which decisions 
can be made about how basic social institutions should be regulated 
and to define the “space of equality,” the domain over which all 
community members have a just claim to equal treatment.  Although 
individuals may adopt particular life plans that have little in common 
or that conflict or diverge in fundamental ways, all can recognize that 
each requires the ability to cultivate and to exercise certain basic 
physical, intellectual, emotional, and social capacities to be able to 
pursue a life plan.  Moreover, despite differences in dress, demeanor, 
or aspiration, each person can recognize every other person as a 
moral and political equal because each person’s ability to pursue a 
distinctive and meaningful life plan is predicated on his or her ability 
to safeguard and to advance these basic interests. 
I refer to this as an “integrative” approach because it tries to find 
ways of resolving social conflicts that safeguard and advance the un-
derlying basic interests of the relevant parties.  To this end, it holds 
that the basic institutions of a society treat individuals as political 
equals, not by striving to advance the personal ends of any set of indi-
viduals, but by safeguarding and advancing, for each individual, those 
basic interests that make possible the pursuit of a reasonable life plan 
from among a rich array of possible alternatives.  That is, these basic 
institutions operate in a fair way by working to ensure that every indi-
vidual can function effectively in those rudimentary ways that are ne-
cessary in order to be able to pursue some distinctive life plan.  In this 
regard, the integrative approach seeks to be responsive to the idea 
that each individual is a source of value in his or her own right.57  Un-
like consequentialist theories that view individuals as repositories for 
some more fundamental value, such as pleasure or welfare, the inte-
grative approach seeks to respect the status of each community 
member as the political equal of every other without summing the in-
terests of community members together.58  It does this in several ways. 
 
 56 Id. at 165–66. 
 57 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 29 (1971). 
 58 Id. at 32. 
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First, on this view, when the basic interests of some individuals 
are threatened, endangered, or inadequately protected, the impor-
tance of those interests to the individuals’ ability to advance their 
first-order interests provides the normative ground for a claim to as-
sistance from their compatriots.  In the face of a public health emer-
gency, for example, each community member whose basic interests 
are threatened has an equal claim on the basic institutions of their 
society to use the best practices available to safeguard and to advance 
their basic health interests. 
Second, the imperative to meet these claims as effectively and ef-
ficiently as possible provides the justification for creating a social divi-
sion of labor in which some community members are empowered to 
advance the basic interests of others in a particular sphere or domain.  
The institutions of clinical and public health research are one ele-
ment within this larger social division of labor.  Their special role, 
what might be called their moral mission, is to bridge gaps between 
the basic health needs of community members and the capacity of 
the community’s health-related institutions to meet those needs.59  
Members of a pluralistic, liberal, democratic community have a com-
pelling interest to support the research enterprise insofar as it serves 
as an engine for improving the capacity of public health care institu-
tions to fulfill their social role more effectively, either now or in the 
future.60 
Finally, in order to clarify some of the moral constraints on the 
way that permissible research may be carried out, the integrative ap-
proach focuses on two aspects of the link between the basic interests 
of community members and the network of social institutions that are 
necessary to preserve and advance them.  First, as one element within 
the larger social division of labor, research should empower those 
who are willing to take on, as part of their particular life plan, the 
project of preserving the basic health interests of community mem-
bers.  This means that research participants should be able to dedi-
cate their time and energy, and to accept some personal risk, in order 
to advance science for the common good.  Second, although those 
whose basic interests are threatened or endangered can make a legi-
timate demand on their compatriots to provide them with aid or re-
lief, no party can claim that the preservation or advancement of his 
or her basic interests is more important than the basic interests of 
 
 59 See Alex John London, Justice and the Human Development Approach to Internation-
al Research, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 24, 24–25. 
 60 Id. at 34. 
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their compatriots.  As a result, although the institutions that divide 
social labor for the purpose of advancing the basic interests of com-
munity members may empower individuals to advance the common 
good, the same concern must be shown for the basic interests of 
those who make this mission possible as for those that the institutions 
seek to benefit.  In other words, the justification for including clinical 
and public health research in a division of social labor aimed at ad-
vancing the basic interests of community members does not permit 
showing a lesser regard for the basic interests of research participants 
or otherwise compromising their status as political equals of their 
compatriots in the process. 
B. Equality and the Integrative Approach 
It is within this general context that the integrative approach 
understands a general principle that I refer to as the Principle of 
Equality.  The principle holds that as a necessary condition for ethical 
permissibility, research with human subjects must be designed and carried out 
so as not to undermine the standing of research participants as the moral and 
political equals of their compatriots, by either knowingly compromising their 
basic interests or showing unequal concern for their basic interests and the in-
terests of the people the research is intended to serve.  The integrative ap-
proach uses two operational criteria to specify the terms on which 
important research can be advanced without compromising the status 
of research participants as the moral and political equals of their 
compatriots. 
1. The First Operational Criterion for Preserving Equality 
The first operational criterion for preserving equality consists of 
two necessary conditions for ethically acceptable research in the con-
text of a public health emergency.  These conditions are that (1) the 
risks to subjects should be reduced to those that are necessary to address an im-
portant public health question, and (2) when research participants’ basic in-
terests are threatened by sickness, injury, or disease, they must receive a level of 
care and protection for their basic interests that does not fall below what at 
least a reasonable minority of the expert clinical or public health community 
would regard as the most appropriate method of response available. 
Condition (1) entails the position that it is never acceptable to 
expose research participants to risks that are gratuitous or more sig-
nificant than is necessary.  Under this condition, research should take 
place in the context of a public health emergency only if it could not 
feasibly take place in another context.  This requirement also covers 
more than risks to basic interests since the personal interests of re-
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search participants may not be widely shared but may nevertheless be 
of profound importance to the particular individual. 
Condition (2) articulates the mechanism that determines the 
level of care and protection that must be provided to research partic-
ipants whose basic interests are threatened by sickness, injury, or dis-
ease in order to ensure that they are respected as the moral equals of 
their compatriots.  It does this by allowing participants to be allocated 
only to trial arms that provide a level of care or protection that does 
not fall below what at least a reasonable minority of the expert clini-
cal or public health community would recommend as the method 
with the best overall prospect of safeguarding or advancing their ba-
sic interests.  The focus here on not falling below this standard is 
meant to capture the idea that even when there is significant uncer-
tainty or widespread disagreement about what constitutes the best re-
sponse to a particular problem, it is often possible to identify inter-
ventions that would not be regarded as such by even a reasonable 
minority of the relevant expert community. 
Before turning to the second operational criterion, I want to 
note that condition (2) articulates the parameters for what kind of 
offers researchers can make to potential research participants.  The 
focus on basic interests in this condition reflects the idea that com-
munity members owe one another a social division of labor that pre-
serves and protects the rudimentary building blocks that individuals 
need in order to be free to pursue a distinctive life plan.  It is not 
permissible to offer to potential participants research studies provid-
ing a lower level of care and protection for the participants’ basic in-
terests.  However, community members can ask one another to risk, 
sacrifice, alter, or limit ends or goals that are part of their individual 
life plan in an effort to secure for others the freedom to pursue and 
revise such a life plan of their own.  In this view, properly functioning 
IRBs should permit public health researchers to ask participants to 
endure unpleasant experiences, inconveniences, or to bear other 
burdens that do not compromise their basic interests, so long as such 
risks or burdens are necessary for the conduct of sound science and 
have been reduced as much as possible.  It is then up to individuals, 
via the process of informed consent, to evaluate these offers and to 
decide whether those particular burdens are reasonable in light of 
the goals of the research. 
The guidance in the first operational criterion may need to be 
augmented for two reasons.  First, it may be desirable to carry out re-
search in the context of a public health emergency that does not eva-
luate methods of crisis intervention and response.  Such research may 
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involve, for example, the evaluation of diagnostic tests or studies that 
increase our understanding of conditions of sickness and disease that 
arise in a public health emergency. 
Second, even when research studies interventions for public 
health emergency response, the application of these interventions in 
the context of research may differ from their application in a non-
research context.  In particular, additional testing or procedures may 
be required in order to advance research goals that would not be re-
quired in another context.  Often, the most immediate effects of such 
purely research-related elements of a study implicate only the per-
sonal interests of participants, as their risks are limited to some de-
gree of bodily intrusion or discomfort.  But even in this case, such 
procedures nevertheless pose some additional, incremental risk to 
the basic interests of study participants.  As a result, additional guid-
ance is necessary to determine when such incremental risks to the ba-
sic interests of participants are consistent with an equal regard for the 
basic interests of participants and nonparticipants. 
2. The Second Operational Criterion for Preserving 
Equality 
The integrative approach uses a second operational criterion to 
apply the principle of equality to risks that arise from purely research-
related elements of clinical and public health research.  The second 
operational criterion requires that in all cases, the cumulative incremen-
tal risks to the basic interests of individuals that are derived from research ac-
tivities and not offset by the prospect of direct benefit to the individual must 
not be greater than the risks to the basic interests of individuals permitted in 
the context of other socially sanctioned activities that are similar in structure to 
the research enterprise. 
The second operational criterion recognizes that respect for the 
moral equality of individuals cannot require that they be prohibited 
from voluntarily assuming some degree of risk to their basic interests, 
in part because such a standard simply could not be achieved.  Even 
routine activities involve some incremental risk to a person’s basic in-
terests and in liberal, democratic communities, individuals routinely 
participate in activities posing some degree of additional risk to their 
basic interests. 
The challenge, therefore, is to establish when incremental risks 
to the basic interests of individuals violate the underlying commit-
ment to moral equality.  The second operational criterion represents 
a proposal for how these comparisons might be effectuated in prac-
tice. 
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C. Establishing Tests for Meeting the Operational Criteria 
In order to ascertain when these operational criteria are satisfied 
in practice, stakeholders require practical tests with well-defined op-
erational content.  The remainder of this essay is limited to discussing 
research aimed at developing methods or interventions for public 
health emergency response.  This class of research has special impor-
tance because of its direct relevance to the capacity of public health 
institutions to fulfill their social role more effectively in the future.  It 
also provides fertile ground for elaborating the content of the prac-
tical test for the first operational criterion articulated above.  I will 
conclude with some remarks about how a similar test for the second 
operational criterion might be developed. 
The integrative approach uses the following test to apply the first 
operational criterion to research aimed at developing or evaluating 
methods of interventions of public health emergency response: When 
evaluating one or more methods or interventions for public health emergency 
response, individuals must be allocated only to methods or interventions where 
there is conflict or uncertainty in the expert public health community about 
whether the provision of methods other than those under study could more ade-
quately safeguard or advance the basic health interests of individuals. 
This test ensures that two important objectives are met.  First, as 
I will discuss in greater detail in the next section, it promotes re-
search that has significant social value.  In particular, research that 
satisfies this test is designed to resolve substantive conflicts about best 
practices and advance the capacity of important social institutions to 
provide more effective emergency response in the future. 
Second, this test articulates the conditions that decision makers 
can use to determine whether participants in a particular trial receive 
a level of care or relief that does not fall below what would be rec-
ommended by at least a reasonable minority of experts in public 
health as the most appropriate method for providing emergency re-
sponse.61  It does this by permitting individuals to be allocated to in-
terventions on the condition of either uncertainty or conflict about 
the relative merits of those interventions or methods for the basic in-
terests of individuals in the particular case. 
I use the term “uncertainty” to refer to a state in which relevant 
public health experts have not formed a settled opinion about 
whether one mode of crisis response is superior to another.  This is 
not a state of indifference, since I take the latter to refer to a belief 
 
 61 See BAYESIAN METHODS AND ETHICS IN A CLINICAL TRIAL DESIGN (Joseph B. Ka-
dane ed., 1996). 
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that the methods in question are of equivalent value.  By contrast, 
uncertainty represents a situation where the evidence supporting the 
relative merits of candidate interventions is not of sufficient quantity 
or quality to ground the conclusion that it is better than the relevant 
comparator.  The determination of the relevant comparator will de-
pend on the state of knowledge in the relevant expert community.  If, 
for instance, there is no known effective intervention for a condition, 
then a no-treatment or placebo arm may be an appropriate compara-
tor.  If there are several known effective interventions, then one or 
more of these may be the appropriate comparator.  In all cases, the 
role of research is to generate the information that will allow experts 
to clarify the relative merits of the various options in an effort to nar-
row the zone of uncertainty or conflict and to forge a social consen-
sus on the appropriate standard of care. 
In contrast to uncertainty, “conflict” refers to the state of affairs 
in which at least a reasonable minority of experts champion one me-
thod as superior to some other method while at least a reasonable 
minority of other experts champions another method as superior.  In 
this case, each side has a determinate conviction about what is best 
for members of the affected population, but those convictions are in 
conflict.62  The integrative approach permits individuals to be allo-
cated—at random or by some other proper method—to any interven-
tion that would be recommended for them by at least a reasonable 
minority of clinical or public health experts.63 
When the condition of conflict exists, it may not be the case that 
any individual expert is uncertain.  Versions of the equipoise re-
quirement that require individual experts to be uncertain would not 
permit research to go forward under such conditions.  But requiring 
individual uncertainty and prohibiting research from moving forward 
in the face of conflict between reasonable experts does not settle the 
substantive conflict over the relative merits of the competing inter-
ventions.  It merely consigns the affected populations to receiving a 
particular intervention—perhaps as a result of the contingent fact of 
who gets to make the relevant decision—without using the research 
 
 62 ISAAC LEVI, HARD CHOICES: DECISION MAKING UNDER UNRESOLVED CONFLICT 28–
35 (1986). 
 63 The approach that I argue for here thus captures what is most appealing about 
approaches that rely on clinical equipoise, but in a way that is much more general.  
For further discussion of clinical equipoise, see generally Freedman, Equipoise, supra 
note 45; Freedman, Placebo Controlled Trials, supra note 45; London, supra note 43.  
For an analysis of the respect in which the integrative approach is more general in 
scope, see London, Two Dogmas, supra note 34, at 99–116. 
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methods necessary to settle the substantive issue about whether one 
of the alternatives is better than the others.64 
Undoubtedly, our ability to apply this framework in practice will 
be enhanced by having a clear account of how to distinguish what I 
am calling basic interests from non-basic interests.65  Even without 
such clarification, however, this framework still provides substantive 
guidance to decision makers.  In particular, if there is uncertainty 
about how to classify the interest in question, then the appropriate 
default requirement for research in this context is to treat it as basic 
and to apply the above stated practical test. 
V. APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES: SARS, HIV/AIDS,  
AND PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
At this point, some examples provide helpful guidance.  During 
the initial phases of the SARS outbreak, Muller and his colleagues 
noted that caregivers in different locations adopted different strate-
gies for treating SARS victims.66  In the United States, for example, 
clinicians chose to provide only supportive care.67  In other areas, cli-
nicians were more aggressive in providing therapeutic interventions 
to cover a wide range of bacterial and viral pathogens.68  In some of 
these locations, ribavirin was identified as a promising therapeutic 
agent, although considerable uncertainty remained about the relative 
balance of risks and benefits associated with this treatment.69  The ex-
istence of this uncertainty led Muller and his colleagues to attempt to 
design a clinical trial to evaluate the efficacy of ribavirin.70 
As they note, however, increasing reports of toxicity associated 
with high-dose ribavirin therapy led to a preference for lower dose 
regimens in Toronto.71  Such reports, along with the isolation of 
SARS-CoV and subsequent in vitro susceptibility studies, were suffi-
cient to bring personnel in Toronto to discontinue ribavirin as a 
treatment for SARS.72 
 
 64 See Emily L. Evans & Alex John London, Equipoise and the Criteria for Reasonable 
Action, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 441, 444-448 (2006); London, supra note 43, at 577–84. 
 65 See generally London, supra note 7 (discussing this distinction and its signific-
ance for larger debates about interpersonal tradeoffs in research ethics). 
 66 See Matthew P. Muller et al., Clinical Trials and Novel Pathogens: Lessons Learned 
from SARS, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 389, 389 (2004). 
 67 Id. at 391. 
 68 Id. at 389. 
 69 Id. at 389–94. 
 70 Id. at 389–91. 
 71 Id. at 390–91. 
 72 Muller et al., supra note 66, at 389. 
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Currently, no consensus exists on the best practice for treating 
SARS.73  However, if new animal and in vitro studies and an increased 
understanding of SARS-CoV were to lead some experts to favor one 
set of interventions while other experts favor a different set, then the 
expert clinical community would move from a state of uncertainty in-
to a state of conflict.  The expert community may remain in conflict 
about whether the relative net therapeutic advantage of one or more 
of these options dominates or is clearly superior to supportive care 
alone.  If, on the other hand, some experts still believe, for example, 
that the side effects of candidate agents are severe and their thera-
peutic merits sufficiently uncertain, then it may remain permissible to 
randomize some participants to supportive care and others to promis-
ing candidate interventions. 
This highlights the second important feature of the practical 
test.  Namely, it promotes research with significant social value.  This 
social value emanates from the fact that research meeting this test is 
designed to resolve substantive conflicts about best practices and the-
reby advance the capacity of important social institutions to provide 
more effective emergency response in the future. 
Similarly, we are currently in the midst of a global HIV-AIDS 
pandemic.  A variety of preventative strategies have been tested in 
clinical trials, ranging from vaccines74 to microbicides75 to male cir-
cumcision.76 In each of these cases, some investigational intervention 
has been compared with a placebo or a no-treatment arm.77  The use 
 
 73 See Lauren J. Stockman, Richard Bellamy & Paul Garner, SARS: Systematic Re-
view of Treatment Effects, 3 PLOS MED. 1525 (2006). 
 74 Margaret I. Johnston & Anthony S. Fauci, An HIV Vaccine—Challenges and Pros-
pects, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 888, 888–90 (2008). 
 75 Janneke H.H.M. van de Wijgert & Robin J. Shattock, Vaginal Microbicides: Mov-
ing Ahead After an Unexpected Setback, 21 AIDS 2369, 2369 (2007). 
 76  See Bertran Auvert et al., Randomized, Controlled Intervention Trial of Male 
Circumcision for Reduction of HIV Infection Risk: The ANRS 1265 Trial, 2 PLOS 
MED. 1112, 1112 (2005); Robert C. Bailey et al., Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in 
Young Men in Kisumu, Kenya: A Randomised Controlled Trial, 369 LANCET 643, 643 
(2007); Ronald H. Gray et al., Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention in Men in Rakai, 
Uganda: A Randomized Trial, 369 LANCET 657, 657 (2007). 
 77 This statement is potentially misleading if it is taken to imply that participants 
in these trials were provided with no care or preventative measures other than either 
the investigational intervention or a placebo substitute.  In actuality participants in 
these trials are provided with a basket of care that is aimed at reducing their suscep-
tibility to contracting HIV.  This usually consists of the provision of counseling and 
other social services, access to condoms, and even treatment for additional sexually 
transmitted diseases.  For example, Auvert and colleagues randomized participants 
to immediate circumcision or to circumcision at a later date.  See Auvert et al., supra 
note 76 at 1113–14.  Individuals in the latter arm could thus serve as a control for the 
former group during the time they remained uncircumcised.  Nevertheless,  all sub-
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of such designs is permissible in many of these trials because the dis-
tinctive immunological challenges posed by the HIV virus have re-
sulted in an inability to replicate the successes that have been 
achieved against more common viral agents.78  As a result, considera-
ble uncertainty remains about whether a novel vaccine or microbi-
cide will result in a net benefit to recipients.  This is underscored by 
evidence that in some instances, microbicides79 or vaccine candidates80 
may have increased the susceptibility of some recipients to serocon-
version. 
In contrast to HIV, we have a much better understanding of the 
major immunological properties of the influenza virus.  This is not to 
say that our knowledge is perfect or that the influenza virus is not 
constantly changing.  It is to say, rather, that knowledge regularly 
used to create vaccines for nonpandemic flu strains is being applied 
fruitfully to the creation of vaccines for potential pandemic strains.  
Several H5N1 vaccines have been developed; one has been licensed 
in Europe, and another received FDA approval in 2007.81  Important 
work is also underway to develop a cell-based vaccine, rather than the 
traditional egg-based vaccine, and to develop adjuvant agents that 
may reduce the dose necessary to produce an immune response in 
recipients while also potentially broadening cross-clade immunity.82 
These vaccines do not appear to be as efficacious as vaccinations 
for nonpandemic strains, but their true efficacy could only be ascer-
tained in the face of an influenza outbreak.  Although it is likely that 
the clinical community may be uncertain or in conflict over the rela-
tive prophylactic merits of these various vaccine candidates, there 
does not appear to be credible uncertainty about the relative merits 
of at least some of these agents in comparison to comfort care or 
non-vaccination.83  As a result, it would not be permissible to include 
a placebo-only arm in an eventual trial of these various agents.  This is 
because the health consequences of contracting a pandemic flu strain 
 
jects received counseling, condoms, and ancillary care for opportunistic infections.  
See id. at 1114.  For a general discussion of the importance of distinguishing the pro-
vision of placebo as a substitute for some element of standard therapy or prophylaxis 
from the addition of placebo to standard therapeutic or prophylactic strategies, see 
Stephen Senn, Placebo Misconceptions, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Sept. 2009, at 53. 
 78 Johnston & Fauci, supra note 74, at 889–90. 
 79 See van de Wijgert & Shattock, supra note 75, at 2369. 
 80 Johnston & Fauci, supra note 74, at 889. 
 81 Isabel Leroux-Roels et al., Broad Clade 2 Cross-Reactive Immunity Induced by an 
Adjuvanted Clade 1 rH5N1 Pandemic Influenza Vaccine, 3 PLOS ONE 1, 3, 5 n.25 (2008). 
 82 Id. at 1–2. 
 83 Id. 
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are likely to be dire, and because the strong grounds for the belief 
that the current FDA approved vaccine will provide recipients with a 
significant degree of protection means that the option of a no-
treatment or placebo-only arm falls outside of the zone of uncertainty 
or conflict within the relevant expert communities. 
As the number of prophylactic or therapeutic candidates in-
creases, it becomes more likely that there will be either uncertainty or 
conflict in the expert clinical or public health communities about 
how best to prevent or treat the particular pandemic strain that even-
tually does emerge.  If this is the case, there may be significant utility 
to designing head-to-head trials of the relevant interventions in order 
to ascertain the best practices for prevention and treatment.  But one 
should not underestimate the potential difficulties associated with de-
signing and conducting such a trial in the context of a public health 
emergency.  Among other things, careful consideration will have to 
be paid to ensuring that a study hypothesis can be formulated in real-
time that captures the relevant uncertainty or conflict in the expert 
communities.  This is likely to be particularly difficult in a context 
where information is scarce or rapidly changing. 
Bringing well-designed clinical trials to fruition in the fluid and 
often uncertain context of a public health emergency poses thorny 
logistical challenges.  Such trials are also likely to be resource-
intensive at a time when health-related resources are scarce and must 
be shepherded with care.  This means that the decision to initiate re-
search in this context must be made with care.  Nevertheless, it is of 
paramount importance to enact research programs when there is 
compelling reason to think that addressing the study hypothesis 
represents one of, if not the best means of generating the informa-
tion, interventions, practices, methods, or policies that are needed to 
bridge significant gaps between the basic health interests of commu-
nity members and the capacity of the community’s health-related 
structures to safeguard or advance those interests. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Whether social solidarity and institutional trust can be secured 
or maintained when the common good is threatened by an actual 
pandemic will hinge on a variety of factors, many of which involve 
community planning, preparedness, and communication.  The point 
of the above analysis is not to claim that the integrative approach can 
address all of these factors.  It is, rather, to argue that it provides a 
better foundation than the two most prominent alternatives for creat-
ing an institutional framework for clinical and public health research 
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that would merit such trust and could provide an anchor for such so-
lidarity, within a limited domain, if the community in which it were 
implemented were fully aware of the terms on which it functions. 
In particular, I have sketched an operational test that the inte-
grative approach uses to provide greater practical guidance to stake-
holders than is available from the common rule approach.  This prac-
tical guidance is also grounded in higher-level moral commitments 
that, I argue, should have broader normative scope than the relatively 
parochial norms of the duty of personal care approach.  This ap-
proach is also more flexible and less paternalistic than the duty of 
personal care approach in that it provides a justification for an insti-
tutional design where it is permissible to offer some individuals the 
opportunity to accept increased personal risks and bear greater per-
sonal burdens with the goal of advancing science that will serve the 
common interest.  At the same time, this approach recognizes that 
the willingness of individuals to contribute to such endeavors may be 
compromised by an institutional setup equating such a willingness 
with a broad permission to disregard or to be indifferent to the basic 
interests of research participants.  Unlike the common rule ap-
proach, therefore, the integrative approach helps to eliminate uncer-
tainty about the moral norms that structure the research process.  
Further, it expresses a clear moral and practical commitment to fos-
tering research that advances the common interest without compro-
mising the moral and political equality of research participants in the 
process. 
Every framework of research ethics must provide stakeholders 
with guidance on how to evaluate risks associated with purely re-
search-related elements of clinical trials.  Every framework must 
therefore strike a balance between restricting the liberty of communi-
ty members to freely accept some incremental risks to their basic in-
terests and preserving public trust in the institutions of research as 
adequately responsive to the rights and welfare of research partici-
pants. 
The second operational criterion for preserving equality 
represents a proposal for assessing clinical trial risks in a more trans-
parent and systematic fashion.  In order to generate a practical test 
for this criterion, stakeholders will have to identify comparison classes 
of activities that are sufficiently similar in structure to clinical re-
search that they can be used to calibrate assessments of incremental, 
research-related risks.  I have argued elsewhere that structurally simi-
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lar activities should have certain features.84  For instance, the incre-
mental risks to the basic interests of individuals who engage in these 
activities should result from efforts to benefit others or to advance the 
common good. Similarly, the risks associated with such activities 
should be viewed as necessary evils and not as desirable in their own 
right, as is often the case with dangerous pursuits such as rock climb-
ing or motorcycle riding. To the extent possible, such activities 
should also be the subject of social oversight or review so that there is 
some reason to view their associated risks as socially acceptable. 
I have proposed using the activities of public service professions, 
such as paramedics or firefighters, as possible reference classes.85 It 
may be useful to consider other public service professions as well, 
such as social workers and even public health officials. The point of 
this selection process is to construct comparison classes that can be 
used to ensure that the incremental risks to the basic interests of re-
search participants that are associated with purely research-related 
elements of an investigation are not greater than the incremental 
risks to the basic interests of others in the community who work on a 
routine basis to advance the common good. 
A public health emergency, however, is a unique situation.  Ele-
ments of the larger infrastructure that supports a range of rights and 
abilities of community members may be inoperative or compromised.  
As recent experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita powerfully il-
lustrated, public health crises can exacerbate preexisting social in-
equalities, exacting the harshest toll on marginalized, poor, or other-
wise vulnerable groups. Special care must be taken, therefore, not to 
place significant additional burdens on the basic interests of disaster 
victims. Additionally, special care must be taken to ensure that the 
burdens of such research are not disproportionately borne by per-
sons who are already socially, economically, or politically disadvan-
taged and that special protections are in place to ensure that the risks 
to individuals from such groups are minimized. 
It will be important, therefore, to ensure that a wide range of 
stakeholders are involved in the process of determining the content 
of the practical test for the second operational criterion.  It is also 
important to ensure that this process is completed prior to the onset 
of a major public health crisis. 
Undoubtedly, many of the points made here will strike some 
readers as controversial and in need of further philosophical defense, 
 
 84 See London, Reasonable Risks, supra note 34, at 2881–83. 
 85 Id. 
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refinement, or explication.  I hope, however, that the outline pro-
vided here will persuade the charitable reader that it is worth under-
taking this process of refinement and defense in earnest. 
 
 
